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Regulation versus pricing in urban water 
policy: the case of the Australian National 
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The Australian National Water Initiative (NWI) builds on the foundations of earlier water
reforms, attempts to correct earlier errors in both policy and its implementation, and
seeks to better deﬁne some of the policy aims with the beneﬁt of hindsight. However,
despite the deliberate effort to improve on earlier reforms, the NWI still embodies
a signiﬁcant economic paradox. Although policymakers have shown their faith in
the market insofar as allocating water between competing agricultural interests is
concerned, they have not shown the same degree of faith in the ability of urban users to
respond to price signals. This paper attempts to shed at least some light on this ques-
tion by examining the responses of a number of State governments across Australia to
the NWI. The paper speciﬁcally explores the rationale for non-price regulation in the








The National Water Initiative (NWI) displays considerable faith in market
forces to address the allocation of water between competing agricultural interests.
However, the same policy has much less faith in the ability of urban users to
respond to price signals. Market forces are continually championed as ‘moving
the resource to its highest value use’ in an irrigation context and yet bureaucratic
intervention is used to distinguish proﬂigate and acceptable water uses in an
urban setting. Although a comprehensive assessment of the water reforms in
both sectors is beyond the scope of this paper, we seek to shed some light on
the policy response in the urban domain by examining the reactions of a number
of state governments across Australia to the dwindling bulk water supplies of
major capital cities. In particular, the paper explores the tendency of state
governments to rely relatively more heavily on quantity control in response to
shrinking urban water supplies, rather than on the price mechanism.
The paper is divided into four main sections. Section 2 brieﬂy outlines the
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while Section 3 examines a number of the states’ responses to the changing
policy landscape. Section 4 attempts to develop a conceptual model to
enhance our understanding of the current policy settings. The paper ends in
Section 5 with some brief concluding remarks.
 
2. Policy evolution of the national water initiative
 
In February 1994, a major milestone was reached in Australian water policy
when the Council of Australian Governments (COAG 1994) agreed to the
‘Water Resource Policy’. The policy was an Australia-wide effort to turn
back the tide on the natural resource degradation resulting from a century of
exploitation of the nation’s water resource (MDBC 2000). In essence, the new
mantra to arise from this policy was ‘efﬁciency and sustainability’ – a catch
cry that has permeated the Australian water debate ever since.
Setting the continuation of water reform as an agenda item for the Howard
government’s third term, (then) Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson
argued that ‘if the community now wishes to change [the] balance in favour
of environmental responsibility, the community must address the question of
who should pay’ (Anderson 2001). In this context, sharper focus was being
placed on urban water users whose behaviour, under the initial reforms, had
been subject to relatively modest scrutiny.
 
2.1 Urban water reform in the NWI
 
The purported aim of the NWI with regard to urban water reform is to
encourage the reclamation, re-use and recycling of wastewater, make water
trading between rural and urban users viable, increase water efﬁciency, and
improve pricing for metropolitan water (COAG 2004).
The means by which the states and territories will meet these objectives are
broadly separated into efforts designed to reduce demand and policies that
encourage innovation in water use. At the national level, four speciﬁc measures
have been identiﬁed as part of the NWI. In the ﬁrst place, the ‘Water Efﬁciency
Labelling Scheme’ will come into effect, requiring mandatory labelling and
minimum standards for certain household appliances. Second, the states will
implement a ‘Smart Water Mark’ for appliances and products used in household
gardens. Third, water authorities will upgrade supply and discharge systems,
including the repair of leaks and overﬂows. Finally, jurisdictions will consider
the extension of temporary water restrictions and associated public education
strategies into permanent low-level arrangements (COAG 2004).
 
3. States’ responses to the NWI
 
The responses of most state governments to the NWI’s broader requirements
on urban water reform can be summarised as either being aimed at managing
demand for or supply of urban water. The Governments of New South Wales 
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(NSW), Victoria (Vic.), Queensland (Qld), South Australia (SA), and the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have been active in developing long-term
strategies for the management of urban water, releasing detailed policy
documents applicable to their jurisdictions. The Western Australian (WA)
government has also examined the issue, and recently reorganised the
executive management of water in that state. However, it has yet to release
a formal policy. The remaining states have been relatively less concerned with




In essence, policymakers have two generic tools at their disposal: changes in
the price paid for water and restrictions on how water can be used. We have
examined the demand management policies in place for six jurisdictions




All of the states, with the exception of Qld, have introduced pricing structures
in metropolitan areas termed ‘inclining block tariffs’. This results in increasingly
rising prices as the quantity of water consumed increases. These range from
a two-stage block in Sydney and SA, to a nine-stage block in regional WA.
Regional areas in Vic. and NSW are characterised by varying pricing structures,
with some implementing inclining blocks, and others maintaining a conventional




Non-price demand management techniques usually take the form of prohibi-
tions on certain types of water usage, such as watering gardens during the
middle of the day, and incentive programs that encourage residents to
make more efﬁcient use of water, such as installing low-ﬂow shower heads.
Although some states currently impose water restrictions on a temporary
basis, others have moved to make them permanent. For example, in Vic.
cleaning paved areas by hose is now prohibited regardless of the volume of




In the context of urban water provision, efforts to maintain and/or increase
supply can be grouped into three initiatives: (i) increasing the efﬁciency in the
storage and management of existing supplies; (ii) recycling previously
consumed potable water; and (iii) investment in new infrastructure. Once
again we have examined the policies in place for six jurisdictions, with the
results summarised in Table 2.
Most states are either investigating or actively pursuing water recycling

































































































































Two-stage inclining block tariff:















Various pricing regimes determined by 
individual councils
Sydney temporary water restrictions
•W a tering of lawns and gardens by handheld hose and/or drip irrigation restricted to 








•P ermit required to ﬁll pools
• Hosing of hard surfaces prohibited
Efﬁciency measures
• Mandatory labelling system indicating the relative efﬁciency of water appliances
• Extending the ‘retro-ﬁt’ scheme
• Sale of single-ﬂush toilet systems will be prohibited
•F r om 2007 residential dwellings must be accompanied by a water-efﬁciency certiﬁcate 
when sold








Three-stage inclining block tariff:



















Various Regional Water Authorities 
Eight of 17 authorities have introduced 
inclining block tariffs
Remainder have increased existing 
water-use charges and lowered ﬁxed 
charges
State-wide permanent water restrictions
• Cleaning paved areas by hose banned 
• Hand-watering of gardens and washing of cars to be by use of trigger nozzle only
•A utomatic sprinkler systems must be ﬁtted with rain sensors 
•P ools cannot be ﬁlled without permission from water authority 
Efﬁciency measures
•T wo water-saving schemes (Water Smart Gardens and Home Rebate Scheme) to 
be extended
•W a ter-sensitive design to be implemented in new urban developments
• Education and awareness campaign: water bills more informative and public 
reporting of water authority’s progress in meeting water-saving targets
• Support of water efﬁciency labelling for household appliances 





Two-stage inclining block tariff:














Permanent water restrictions 
•R estricted hours for watering gardens
• Hosing of hard surfaces prohibited 
• Cars can only be washed with bucket or trigger-activated hose
Efﬁciency measures
























































































































































Three-stage inclining block tariff:




























•P aved areas may only be cleaned using high-pressure hoses or mop and bucket
• Car washing by trigger hose, high-pressure cleaner or from bucket
Efﬁciency measures
•G overnment to support the minimum standards and efﬁciency labelling scheme for 
water consuming appliances
• Subsidises installation of efﬁcient appliances




Five-stage inclining block tariff:






























Nine-stage inclining block tariff:



















•F ollowing six blocks not uniformly priced 
across state – dependant upon cost of 
supplying water to each town
Temporary water restrictions
•W a tering of lawns and gardens by sprinkler restricted to two allotted days per week, 
either in the morning or evening, but not both
• Hand-watering permitted at anytime 
• Hosing of hard surfaces prohibited
Efﬁciency measures
•R ebates for the installation of water-efﬁcient shower heads and washing machines 











•W a tering of lawns and gardens by sprinkler prohibited
• Handheld hosing and topping up of pools only permitted on three speciﬁed days a 
week, depending on house number, and only outside of daylight hours
• Some relaxation for new lawns and gardens
• No watering permitted on Mondays 
•W a tering with handheld buckets permitted at any time 
•W ashing of cars permitted at anytime with a handheld hose ﬁtted with trigger nozzle 
or with high-pressure water cleaning unit
• Hosing of hard surfaces prohibited
• Use of hoses and sprinklers for water play toys not permitted at any time
 
Sources: Department of Premier and Cabinet (2003); Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (2004); Department of Sustainability Environment




























































































































Supply responses to national water reform policy
Jurisdiction/policy
Supply side
Efﬁcient use Recycling New Infrastructure
NSW/Metropolitan 
Water Plan
•T ap deeper water of existing 
dams
•D ivert ﬂows of neighbouring 
rivers into main supply dam
•I nvestigate ground water as a 
new supply source
• Supply recycled water to meet the needs of 
Sydney’s growth areas by releasing greenﬁeld 
development sites adjacent to existing sewerage 
treatment plants
• No plans to recycle by pumping treated 
efﬂuent into major dams
• ‘No need for a 12th dam’
• Construct a desalination plant when 




Together – The 
White Paper
• All urban water authorities will 
be required to prepare Water 
Supply–Demand Strategies
• Interconnecting water supply 
systems
•R econnect Targo Reservoir
• Distribution losses to be 
stemmed through leakage 
reduction programs
• Fit-for-purpose use: Various regional urban 
water authorities supply recycled water for 
irrigation purposes
No plans to place treated water into Melbourne’s 
drinking water supply system
•A   n umber of new developments have included 
so-called third pipe systems, however, 
government will not mandate such systems
•G overnment support for selected recycling 
schemes




•R educe government business 
water consumption
• Continue leakage reduction 
program

























































































































































• Subsidises installation of 
rainwater tanks
•R equire the separation, in new houses, of 
washing machine and bathroom drainage pipes 
to facilitate recycling




•R ebates for the installation of 
garden bores and rainwater 
tanks
• Piping of irrigation channels
•I nvestigating the recharge of aquifers with 
treated wastewater
• Construction of a seawater 
desalination plant in Perth
•T wo new dams at Samson Brook and 
Wokalup Creek
• Three deep bores and nine shallow 
bores
Qld./Waterforever • Fix valve and pipe leakages
•R educe pressure of water 
supply
•I nvestigate use of treated recycled water for 
industrial use
•I nvestigate mixing highly treated recycled water 
into existing rainwater storages
•I nvestigate desalination




Sources: Department of Premier and Cabinet (2003); Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (2004); Department of Sustainability and




. (2004); SEQWater Corporation (2005). 
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ﬁelds and golf courses. Many are mandating or encouraging new housing
developments to include so-called third-pipe systems, whereby waste water
from the laundry is used to water the garden or ﬂush the toilet.
WA is planning the construction of a desalination plant in order to supple-
ment dwindling supplies, NSW recently announced plans to construct a plant
should Sydney dam storages fall below 30 per cent of capacity, whereas two
other states (Qld and Vic.) are investigating desalination as a supply manage-
ment option. Perhaps reﬂecting the perilous state of its urban water supply,
WA  has also built two new dams as well as sinking a number of new bores.
By contrast, Vic. and NSW have ruled out the construction of new dams.
 
4. Searching for a policy rationale
 
The tendency of state governments across Australia to impose a combination
of variable pricing and direct quantity regulation to reduce the quantity of
water consumed by urban constituents seems at odds with the corresponding
policy stance on rural water allocation. Most state governments have relied
relatively more heavily on the price of rural water to determine both where it
goes and the quantity demanded. An important exception is the allocation
of bulk water to rural and regional town water supplies. In NSW and Vic.
this is determined by regulation and usually expressed in pre-determined
volumetric terms. Despite this exception, it is useful to explore the potential
rationale for such a policy stance. Accordingly, in this section we develop
a conceptual model of a stylised market for urban water in an effort to shed
light on the market for water by speculating on what form the individual
demand and supply curves for a ‘typical’ household might take. We then
examine the role policy instruments, such as direct quantity controls and
prices, can play as allocative tools, and seek to develop an explanation for why
governments have chosen to employ this dual policy response to the problem.
In developing a model for an individual household’s demand and supply of
water, it seems reasonable to assume that in the limit the demand curve is
totally price inelastic for essential water use, and progressively becomes more
elastic as one moves to less essential and more discretionary uses. Thus, for
an individual household their demand curve for water can be approximated




The reforms of the 1990s saw the progressive introduction of the various
pricing regimes, as outlined in Table 1. Thus, for a given household, they now
perceive their water supply curve as a series of horizontal curves shifting
vertically at the quantity where the price of water increases – illustrated in
Figure 1.
The number of segments is determined by the number of blocks in a state’s
inclining block tariff structure. For example, in NSW the supply curve would
consist of only two segments, whereas a rural household in WA would
perceive their supply curve as consisting of nine segments. A limiting factor
to note here is that post-consumption charging for domestic water is likely 
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to dampen the impact of inclining block tariff structures, as households are
unlikely to go to the trouble of noting when their consumption has moved
from one block to the next per period. As a result, the perceived supply curve
illustrated in Figure 1 is probably best thought of as an extreme example.
 
4.1 The effect of an aggregate water shortage
 
We now assume that the relevant bulk water supply has reduced because of
a prolonged reduction in rainfall. As a result, the aggregate quantity of water
available for supply has diminished. In a ‘ﬁrst principles’ analysis of markets,
we would expect this to result in a shift left of the supply curve. However, at
least two factors suggest that this will not be the case. First, the supply curve
faced by households is essentially a construct of the regulatory regime that
governs the pricing of urban water. For instance, in NSW the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal determines the structure of the relevant
pricing regime. In the past these determinations have been heavily inﬂuenced
by production costs associated with urban water provision and not the
Figure 1 Stylised model of individual household water supply and demand. 
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immediate scarcity of the water resource. As a result, a substantial change
would be required in the pricing policy of the regulator for it to shift the
household’s perceived supply curve in the face of a water supply shortage.
Second, it seems reasonable to expect that the individual household, without
any direct control from a central authority, is unlikely to perceive the supply
curve it faces as having changed so long as the price schedule is unchanged
and water continues to ﬂow from the tap. If both these assumptions hold,
then the water supply authority must resort to other methods of decreasing
aggregate water consumption by households. 
One option is to request more frequent increases in the rate at which tariffs
are adjusted. However, pricing determinations are typically drawn-out affairs,
requiring exhaustive and transparent consultation with stakeholders, resulting
in signiﬁcant time lags between changes in pricing structures. In contrast,
the executive arm of government is able to implement direct quantity control
methods, such as water restrictions via regulation, relatively free from the
requirements to consult that are placed upon independent price regulators.
By way of illustration, assume that policymakers want the household depicted
in Figure 1 to decrease its consumption from Q1 to Q2. This could be
achieved by moving the point at which the third tariff begins so that it aligns
with a point equal to Q2. Another option is to implement water restrictions
in the hope that they will reduce consumption to Q2. Alternatively, the
government could make use of a combination of price and quantity controls
to achieve its desired outcome. 
A third consideration in this context is the relative uncertainty of price
adjustments and quantity controls. Given that the supply curve in this case is
a manifestation of negotiations between the water authority and the economic
regulator, there is a risk that the resulting price may not bring forth the required
adjustment in water consumption. Put simply, getting the price ‘right’ in this
‘market’ depends upon the information available to the parties and their
capacities to accurately predict demand. There is also no guarantee that the
demand function will remain static throughout this process. Thus, quantity
restriction represents a less risky option for water authorities insomuch as
any miscalculation of the price required to dampen demand will likely attract
severe political costs – either because the price remains too low and thus
threatens minimum subsistence supplies, or the price is set so high as to raise
serious equity concerns.
As Table 1 demonstrates, most state governments have implemented a
combination of both price and quantity controls in order to reduce aggregate
domestic water consumption. However, it is also apparent that relatively
more weight has been given to direct quantity controls. A number of useful
insights advanced by Weitzman (1974) can assist in explaining this policy
response. He examined the general case of regulating a well-deﬁned
commodity either by central control or use of the price mechanism, and
developed a model in order to measure the comparative advantage of each
method. 
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Weitzman (1974) found that the price mechanism could have detrimental con-
sequences ‘when marginal costs are nearly ﬂat [since] the smallest miscalcula-
tion or change results in either much more or much less than the desired
output’ or ‘if beneﬁts are almost kinked at the optimum level of output, [as]
there is a high degree of risk aversion and the centre cannot afford being
even slightly off the mark.’ Both observations seem particularly relevant to
our model given our speciﬁcation of the individual household supply and
demand curves. Weitzman (1974) contends that under these circumstances
‘the quantity mode scores a lot of points because a high premium is put on
the rigid output controllability which only it can provide under uncertainty.’
In a later paper, Weitzman (1977) found that in a situation where a limited
supply of a quantity must be supplied to those who need it most, rationing is
relatively more effective if the demand for the good is relatively uniform and
the given society is characterised by relative income inequality, because it
‘essentially prevents those with relatively large incomes from monopolizing
consumption of the commodity in question.’ Although we have expressly
sought to leave the inﬂuence of income in abeyance throughout this analysis,
the government may prefer to place relatively more weight on rationing
mechanisms for this reason.
In this vein, Weitzman (1977) observed that although rationing does impinge
on consumer sovereignty, ‘there is a class of commodities whose just distribu-
tion is sometimes viewed as a desirable end in itself,’ and for these goods the
open violation of consumer sovereignty is justiﬁed by seeking distributional
equity. Furthermore, governments may simply prefer quantity control as it is
less likely to incur income losses arising from higher prices.
A number of institutional impediments may also present a barrier to the
reliance upon the price mechanism to ration dwindling supplies of water.
First, urban water prices are typically exogenously determined by a price
regulator, subject to periodic review. As a consequence, price is generally
unable to respond to short-run supply constraints such as drought. Second,
water has traditionally been priced in order to recover some portion of the
costs of provision. To switch to a pricing philosophy that more fully embodies
a price to reﬂect immediate scarcity may require a signiﬁcant change in the
institutional setting, implying large transactions costs, the quantum of which
may be even greater where the predominant policy paradigm has been to rely





Although theoretical models such as those developed by Weitzman (1974,
1977) have been helpful in explaining why governments have relied more
heavily on quantity controls, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of water




. (1980) found that conservation programs are generally effective in changing
consumer behaviour and often induce reductions in urban water use at a time
of a water supply shortage. However, they also concluded that it is possible to
alter water consumption by manipulating its price. Conversely, Nieswiadomy
(1992) concluded that conservation measures do not appear to reduce water 
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., Renwick and Archibald (1998) found
that combined price and conservation measures – which as Table 1 demonstrates
is becoming the dominant policy setting in Australia – resulted in a reduction
in water usage, although the degrees of relative reduction varied across differing
household groups. 
Perhaps the most powerful ﬁnding from a policymakers’ point of view was




. (1984); they showed that, in order for conserva-
tion measures to be effective in the long run, they must be accompanied by a
price increase, otherwise consumers will reduce water consumption in some
activities, like ﬁtting a low-ﬂow shower head, but then use the ‘saved’ water
on other uses, such as hand watering the garden for longer periods on
allowable days. Without an increase in price to provide an incentive for
households to reduce consumption, in the long run consumers tend not to
reduce the aggregate quantity of water consumed. Thus, in the face of a
long-run supply constraint, such as that arising from a lengthy change in





A review of the response of state governments to the NWI shows that non-price
regulation of urban water use is widespread and often prominent as a policy
response. The rationale for this approach arguably resides in the difﬁculties
of amending price to reﬂect the immediate scarcity of water in storages within
the present regulatory environment and the potentially delayed or uncertain
response of households to price signals. In these circumstances, non-price
controls of water-use behaviour appear justiﬁed in the short term.
Unfortunately, it seems that the current use of water restrictions to curb
excessive water consumption in Australia’s capital cities is set to continue in




. For example, as outlined in Section 2, the Vic.
government intends low-level water restrictions to remain in place regardless
of the state of the local water supply. The SA government has also imple-
mented so-called permanent water restrictions that bear no relation to dam
levels. Furthermore, the NWI speciﬁcally calls for the conversion of temporary
low-level water restrictions into permanent features of state water policy. One
might be forgiven for concluding that the use of water restrictions has been
transformed from a policy instrument aimed at delivering a short-term rapid
response to an aggregate water shortage, to a policy designed to deal with water





. (1984) and others have concluded this policy stance is likely
to fail. It is often the case that constituents ﬁnd ways and means to defeat
regulation. For example, given that state governments rely heavily on citizens
to report breaches of water restrictions, it is not inconceivable that after a
period of time neighbours may agree not to report one another’s breaches
in order to avoid detection. By contrast, it would be difﬁcult for the same 
Regulation versus pricing in Urban Water Policy 449
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006
 
neighbours to avoid the increased expenditure on water should the price
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